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COMMENTS
RALPH

N.

CLOUGH

I would like to comment just briefly on the papers that have
been presented, raising a number of points which may be useful to
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discuss further in the question period. First, with respect to Dr.
Heuser's paper, it was a very interesting and unusual paper which
dealt with materials that most American scholars are unfamiliar
with. It brought out very clearly the obstacles to trade and
investment growing out of the fact that the German Federal
Republic has had no diplomatic relations with the Republic of
China since World War II. For example, he points out the absence
of a commercial representative to assist German merchants in
handling trade disputes in Taiwan. But he also shows ways in
which many of the obstacles have been overcome. For example, he
points out that a unilateral declaration by the government of the
Republic of China concerning legal protection for a German
investor qualifies that investor for participation in the German
national investment guarantee program. A third point that comes
out in Dr. Heuser's paper is that despite the obstacles which are
presented by the lack of diplomatic relations, there has been an
impressive growth in trade between Taiwan and the German
Federal Republic.
Perhaps Dr. Heuser could respond to some questions in my
mind concerning these relationships which he didn't touch on. I
wonder, for example, whether there are difficulties impeding
travel by merchants or officials to and from Taiwan. What about
trade fairs? Are these permitted? Further, I think it would be very
interesting to do some comparative studies to see how lack of
diplomatic relations affects trade between the Republic of China
and the Federal Republic of Germany. For example, it would be
interesting to look at the trade between the Federal Republic of
Germany and the Republic of Korea, where diplomatic relations
do exist, to see how much greater that may be and why. It might
also be interesting to examine the trade between France and
Taiwan during the period before 1964 when diplomatic relations
existed between France and Taiwan to see how that compared
with Germah trade, or to compare the trade with Canada before
and after severance of diplomatic relations with Taipei to see how
that trade compares with German trade in these periods.
The paper by Dr. Wu and Dr. Yeh and the statement of the
American Chamber of Commerce in Taiwan cover many of the
same problems. The paper by Dr. Wu and Dr. Yeh is certainly an
excellent analysis of Taiwan's economic development. It identifies
very well those factors responsible for past development and those
essential to Taiwan's future economic development. I think the
paper makes a very strong case that U.S. economic interests in
Taiwan would be best served if the United States were to develop
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a more forthright two-China policy. Downgrading the political
relations between the United States and the Republic of China in
the process of normalizing relations with the PRC would
inevitably have some adverse effect on economic relations
between the United States and Taiwan. However, how lasting or
how serious that adverse effect might be is a matter for debate.
Much would depend on how far the United States went in
downgrading its political relations with the Republic of China.
I think that the paper may underestimate the potential of the
PRC as a trading partner of the United States in the long run.
Certainly, in the past Taiwan has been a good deal more
important and probably will be so for some years. But looking
farther ahead, much will depend on the kind of policies carried out
by the Peking government. Certainly, Mainland China will
always be a largely self-sufficient economy, just like the other big
continental economies, the United States and the Soviet Union.
But trade could grow substantially and provide more opportunities for American traders. It's interesting to note, for example,
that despite the importance of Taiwan as a trading partner with
Japan, there have been some years in which Japanese trade with
Mainland China has been larger than its trade with Taiwan.
It was, of course, beyond the scope of Dr. Wu's paper to
discuss the importance to overall U.S. interests of normalizing
relations with the PRC. The problem currently before U.S. policy
makers is to decide whether the potential gains from normalizing
relations with the PRC would outweigh the potential losses in
regard to interests in Taiwan. In reaching that decision they
would have to consider how possible economic losses in regard to
relations with Taiwan could be minimized. The American
Chamber of Commerce and Dr. Wu's paper point out ways in
which Taiwan's economy could be adversely affected by normalization of U.S. relations with the PRC and they identify a number
of legal questions which would arise on normalization with
Peking, but they do not consider ways in which the impact of this
change might be lessened, as, for example, by U.S. legislation
which retained guarantees of U.S. investment in Taiwan by the
Overseas Private Investment Insurance Corporation, permitted
the ROC to buy American military equipment; provided for
continuing access by the ROC to Eximbank loans, and so forth.
These are very complex, difficult issues. I don't want to get
into a discussion of them here, but I would just point out that
there seem to be two major factors in considering normalization of
relations with Peking and its potential impact on Taiwan. One is
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the psychological factor. It has been pointed out that past
progress in Taiwan and future progress, too, depend a great deal
on confidence, investors' confidence, in the future of Taiwan.
Consequently, if the United States normalizes relations with
Peking, it would need to take whatever action available to it to
preserve confidence in the future of our relations with Taiwan.
The second major area that needs to be considered - I've already
touched on it - is the legislative questions that arise. There are a
multitude of these which would affect American businessmen
dealing in Taiwan. There are many ways in which they might
conceivably be dealt with. All these factors have to be taken into
account. One must try to strike a balance between U.S. interests in
achieving normalization with Peking and retaining a satisfactory
relationship with Taiwan. Thank you.

Dr. Sigur thanked Mr. Clough for his comments which
touched upon some of the very fundamental problems with which
we were trying to deal at this time. Dr. Sigur then introduced the
next discussant, Mr. Talbot Linstrom, to speak. Mr. Linstrom, Dr.
Sigur said, was from one of Washington's most prestigious law
firms, Whitman and Ransom, and he himself had dealt extensively with legal questions involving economic relations between
the United States and the Republic of China and other parts of
Asia as well.
Mr. Talbot Linstrom stated that law, economics, politics,
culture and social realities are all inseparable. He stated that the
papers presented indicate that from the standpoint of U.S.
balance of payments, trade with the PRC has been more favored,
because the greater proportion of our trade with the PRC consists
of American exports, paid for in hard cash, rather than imports.
On the other hand, while the Republic of China may be a large
exporter to the U.S., it is also a major debtor of the United States,
and hence has some leverage in negotiations - the larger the
debt, the greater the economic advantage. He suggested that
Taiwan might consider a reverse investment in underdeveloped
Central American and Caribbean countries and in United States
cities. He also suggested that as to nuclear and defense questions,
an abrogation of the defense treaty might not be so bad, because
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independent countries have a certain bargaining power and such
treaties prevent self-help in terms of a build-up of a country's own
defense mechanisms.
[The following is the summary of Mr. Linstrom's statement.]

COMMENTS
TALBOT S. LINSTROM

I would like to begin my brief remarks by noting that, as I
think both the papers and the prior discussant have indicated,
law, economics, politics, military realities and culture are
inseparable. Although I am here as an attorney, my comments
will of necessity be broader in scope than just the legal aspects of
the future relations between the United States and the Republic of
China and the United States and the People's Republic of China.
To the extent possible in the available time, I would like to cover
all three of the papers presented here today. With respect to the
paper submitted by the Chamber of Commerce, I think we ought
to focus on some critical issues which have been briefly touched
upon, and those are the nature of trade between the United States
and the People's Republic of China and the nature of trade
between the United States and the Republic of China. While trade
is much, much larger in dollar terms between the United States
and Taiwan, in terms of balance of payments, it would appear
from the papers and, I think, on the basis of my own recollection,
that in regard to balance of payments the PRC trade has been
much more advantageous to the United States. There is currently
a very large, it would appear - I don't have any exact figures
immediately available - imbalance in trade between the United
States and Taiwan. Taiwan is a major exporter to the United
States for hard currency. A great portion of the total trade is
Taiwanese exports to the United States, whereas in respect to the
Mainland, the People's Republic, a great portion of that trade is
going from the United States and is being paid for in hard cash.
One of the points that the Chamber of Commerce made in its
paper was that it does not expect - at least it's not currently the
case - that the PRC will utilize American credit. A lot is being
paid in cash. I am not sure in respect to long-term good relations
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between nations that that is a net disadvantage. It may be a net
advantage.
However, with respect to the future, the fact that the Republic
of China has become a major debtor of the United States (I believe
that the paper points out that it is the second largest user after
Brazil of Eximbank-type credits from the United States and I
think that includes both direct credits, guarantees and FCIA
insurance) may give the Republic of China a very substantial - I
don't want to use the word "weapon" - means of leverage in its
future relations with the United States. This debtor relationship is
not a disadvantage to a country. In economic terms it is generally
an advantage, and the larger a debtor you become, the greater
your advantage. This has been proven to be the case in respect to
Yugoslavian financial relationships with both the United States
and the European Community. Whenever the Yugoslavians have
payment problems, they indicate to their creditor countries that
they may have difficulty in meeting their payments. The result of
that generally is an increase in credits available for purchasing
goods in both the Community and in the United States. I am not
suggesting this be done; I am only dealing here with potential
realities of the future, and I think that that factor is certainly a
net advantage to the Republic of China, and it's a net advantage
in dealing with the United States both in political terms and
economic terms.
Returning to the question of the proposition of the trade
between the United States and the Republic of China and its
future course, I think this has been gone into in some depth in Dr.
Wu's paper. Imports from Taiwan to the United States in recent
times have grown much more rapidly than our imports from the
rest of the world. This, of course, has been to a great extent in the
textile field and to a certain extent in shoes. I understand shoes
were touched upon yesterday; textiles were an earlier problem. In
both cases these rapid increases in imports from Taiwan to the
United States have resulted in some type of trade-restrictive
measure by the United States as a result of pressures both from
U.S. labor and manufacturers. The same thing is happening now
in the consumer electronics field. I think the major developments
in this field have also been touched upon both in the International
Trade Commission in the last month and in federal court two days
ago in New York, the Customs Court, with respect to consumer
electronics imports from Japan. But as Dr. Wu has pointed out,
there is a very close relationship between Taiwan, Japan and the
United States. Taiwan is a major supplier, not only of the
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components that go into Japanese consumer electronics, but has
itself been used by Japan to a certain extent as a supplier
manufacturing source for finished consumer electronic product
exports to the United States, a very good use and a very beneficial
one in trade terms to the U.S. consumer. Taiwan has become,
often through the aegis of Japanese trading companies, a major
supplier of consumer electronics to the United States. This means
it is directly involved in what is happening now. Perhaps if one
looks at the future, Taiwan ought to consider what Japan has
done in the U.S., and that is to reverse some of the investment and
itself come into the American market and invest in the areas in
which we have high degrees of unemployment and can utilize the
management and -technology that Taiwan itself is developing. It
can also consider doing the same thing in the underdeveloped
countries of Central America and the Caribbean, which have and
will continue to enjoy very preferential economic relationships
with the United States.
I might touch in the one or two minutes I have left on two
other points in the Chamber of Commerce paper and which were
covered peripherally by the prior discussant. These are nuclear
questions and defense questions. It may not be a disadvantage to
the Republic of China to be under the threat of the abrogation of
the mutual defense treaty. What we have tended to learn in the
world, all of us in this community of nations, is that independence
gives a great deal more bargaining power. To the extent that
Taiwan is closely tied to the U.S. by a defense treaty, it is
hampered in its own development in the nuclear area. Political
pressures are easily applied by the United States to prevent its
purchase of nuclear materials from other countries, and at the
same time similar pressures are probably applied to prevent
Taiwan from developing its own defense capability. A nation the
size of the Republic of China is perfectly capable of developing an
extremely credible defense to protect its own interests in the
future. To the extent it does so, it enhances its prestige in the
world and its ability to deal as it should in the future as an equal
both with the United States and with the PRC.

The Chairperson thanked Mr. Linstrom and commended him
for touching upon, like Mr. Clough, some very fundamental issues
which would certainly generate a great deal of discussion. Dr.
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Sigur said that he thought that we all knew the importance of the
Export-Import Bank to the economic relations between the United
States and the Republic of China. Now we were very fortunate to
have with us a Senior Counsel from the bank who dealt a great
deal with these relations, Mr. Marvin Solomon, to be our third
discussant. The Chairperson then invited Mr. Solomon to speak.
Mr. Solomon stated that Eximbank has the largest stake in
Taiwan of any single institution, and cited the Eximbank's
history of dealings with Taiwan. He said that Eximbank has been
involved in the Republic of China at least since 1942, when it
invested in the construction of the Burma-China Highway. From
1945 to 1948 loans were made to the ROC under the predecessor to
the Marshall Plan. The PRC has no dealings with the Eximbank,
largely because the PRC has an outstanding debt which it
assumed when the ROC left the Mainland. Since 1965, the
Eximbank's dealings with the ROC have been in the areas of
financing power projects and petrochemicals, commercial aircraft,
telecommunications and industrial projects. Other banks participate with Eximbank in making these loans.
[The following is the summary of Mr. Solomon's statement.]

COMMENTS
MARVIN SOLOMON

I am not going to direct myself precisely to the thoughts given
by the speakers this morning, but to nevertheless make comments
like them by first giving a little history and then a little bit of
prognostication for the future involving the Export-Import Bank,
which by the way, is the single institution in the world having the
largest exposure in the Republic of China. We have an exposure of
1.55 billion dollars there.
Eximbank's first relationship with the Republic of China was
in 1942 for the amount of 25 million dollars to build the BurmaChina Highway. In 1945 to 1948, Eximbank's relationship with
the ROC, on the Mainland, was as part of the Marshall Plan
program and its predecessor programs, principally loans for
locomotives, some old World War II Liberty vessels, and some
electrical generating equipment. These loans were in the amount
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of approximately 30 million dollars. When the ROC left the
Mainland and went to Taiwan, the equipment was left behind and
was used by the PRC, and Eximbank considered that since they
were using the equipment they should be paying for these loans.
Unfortunately they haven't paid for them. Consequently, Eximbank is presently blocked from making any form of financial
assistance in the PRC for two reasons, the Foreign Assistance Act
of 1962, as amended, and the fact that there is an outstanding
indebtedness to Eximbank of the PRC. Between the late 1940s and
mid-1965, Eximbank was not active in the ROC. This was the
realm of the Agency of International Development and its
predecessor agencies. Since 1965, Eximbank has been active in the
ROC, principally in the areas of power, transportation, petrochemicals, heavy industry and light industry, and we had an actual
exposure several years ago of $1.8 billion. This amount has
dropped off to about 1.55 billion dollars, principally as repayments
have been received.
One of the more interesting factors of our activity with the
ROC is that we do not go to make transactions by ourselves. We
have participation by commercial banks, usually American
banks, but even in the past year or so, sometimes from Japan,
Canada and Great Britain. In many of these transactions we are
not guaranteeing these banks; they are just participating with us.
Even though most countries in the world recognize the PRC,
the United States manufacturer does not have the ROC's
contracts all to himself. He has to compete with manufacturers of
other countries, and those manufacturers of the other countries
have support from their official export credit agencies. So
notwithstanding the fact that country X does not have diplomatic
relations with the ROC, its official export credit agency is making
most of the guarantees in the ROC. This more or less summarizes
the past and the present situation concerning the Bank's dealings
with the ROC.
The future: Last week we authorized official financial
assistance to the ROC. Last month we had a team over in the
ROC and we found that Eximbank may be getting approximately
2 billion dollars worth of business. I might add that since
Eximbank does not provide 100 percent financing, we're talking
about 1.2 billion dollars in the ROC's present Six-Year Economic
Plan. As I pointed out, the Export-Import Bank as an official
export credit agency is still competing with other export credit
agencies; consequently Eximbank is looking forward to continu-
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ing its excellent relationship with
corporations, banks and industries.

the ROC and its large

Dr. Sigur announced a coffee break for five minutes and then
the session would be resumed for discussion.
The meeting adjourned at 11:05 a.m. and resumed at 11:15
a.m.
Dr. Sigur announced the resumption of the meeting and first
called Dr. Heuser to answer several questions raised by Mr.
Clough.
[The following is the summary of questions and answers.]

